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1 creative
creative [krɪ'eɪtɪv]1 noun(department, work) création f; (person) créatif(ive) m,f;∎ we prefer creative to be handled out of house nous préférons que tout ce qui est création artistique soit réalisé à l'extérieur(person, mind, skill) créatif;∎ to encourage sb to be creative encourager la créativité chez qn;∎ we need some creative thinking nous avons besoin d'idées originales►► euphemism creative accounting (manipulation of accounts) comptabilité f fantaisiste;creative brief (in advertising) plan m de travail créatif, PTC m;creative department service m de création;creative director directeur(trice) m,f de la création;the creative instinct l'instinct m de création;creative team équipe f de création;creative writing techniques fpl de l'écriture;∎ he's good at creative writing il est doué pour l'écriture;creative writing class atelier m d'écriture -
2 the literary world
(the literary world (тж. the world of letters))‘There is no doubt in my mind,’ he went on, ‘That you have a very distinguished and almost unique position in the world of letters.’ (W. S. Maugham, ‘Complete Short Stories’, ‘The Creative Impulse’) — - Я прекрасно знаю, - продолжал мистер Симмонс, - что в литературном мире вы занимаете почетное, можно сказать, исключительное положение.
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3 mind
1.
(the power by which one thinks etc; the intelligence or understanding: The child already has the mind of an adult.) mente, cabeza, cerebro
2. verb1) (to look after or supervise (eg a child): mind the baby.) cuidar2) (to be upset by; to object to: You must try not to mind when he criticizes your work.) importar, molestar3) (to be careful of: Mind (= be careful not to trip over) the step!) tener cuidado4) (to pay attention to or obey: You should mind your parents' words/advice.) hacer caso de
3. interjection(be careful!: Mind! There's a car coming!) ¡cuidado!- - minded- mindful
- mindless
- mindlessly
- mindlessness
- mindreader
- at/in the back of one's mind
- change one's mind
- be out of one's mind
- do you mind!
- have a good mind to
- have half a mind to
- have a mind to
- in one's mind's eye
- in one's right mind
- keep one's mind on
- know one's own mind
- make up one's mind
- mind one's own business
- never mind
- on one's mind
- put someone in mind of
- put in mind of
- speak one's mind
- take/keep one's mind off
- to my mind
mind1 n menteto my mind... a mi parecer / en mi opiniónmind2 vb1. importardo you mind if I sit here? ¿te importa que me siente aquí?2. cuidarwho is minding the baby? ¿quién está cuidando al niño?3. tener cuidadomind out! ¡cuidado!mind your own business! ¡ocúpate de tus asuntos!never mind! ¡no importa! / ¡da igual!tr[maɪnd]1 (intellect) mente nombre femenino2 (mentality) mentalidad nombre femenino■ you've got a dirty mind! ¡qué guarro eres!3 (brain, thoughts) cabeza, cerebro4 (person) cerebro1 (heed, pay attention to) hacer caso de; (care about) importar, preocupar■ don't mind me! ¡no me hagas caso!2 (be careful with) tener cuidado con■ mind the step! ¡cuidado con el escalón!■ mind your head! ¡ojo con la cabeza!3 (look after - child) cuidar, cuidar de; (- house) vigilar; (- shop) atender; (- seat, place) guardar■ could you mind the baby for a minute? ¿me puedes cuidar el bebé un momento?4 (object to, be troubled by) tener inconveniente en, importar, molestar■ I don't mind staying no tengo inconveniente en quedarme, no me importa quedarme■ are you sure you don't mind going? ¿seguro que no te importa ir?■ do you mind the noise? ¿te molesta el ruido?■ would you mind waiting? ¿le importaría esperar?5 (fancy, quite like) venir bien1 (be careful) tener cuidado■ mind (out)! ¡cuidado!, ¡ojo!2 (object to) importar, molestar, tener inconveniente■ do you mind if I open the window? ¿le importa que abra la ventana?■ would you mind if I used your phone? ¿podría utilizar su teléfono?■ do you want a biscuit? --I don't mind if I do! ¿quieres una galleta? --¡pues sí!\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLmind you... ten en cuenta que..., la verdad es que...mind your own business no te metas en lo que no te importanever mind (it doesn't matter) no importa, da igual 2 (don't worry) no te preocupes 3 (let alone) ni hablar denever you mind! ¿a ti qué te importa?to be all in the mind no ser más que imaginacionesto be in one's right mind estar en su sano juicioto be in two minds about something estar indeciso,-a respecto a algoto be of one mind / be of the same mind ser del mismo parecer, tener la misma opiniónto be of sound mind estar en pleno uso de sus facultades (mentales)to be on one's mind preocupar a unoto be out of one's mind estar loco,-ato bear something in mind tener algo en cuenta, tener algo presenteto blow somebody's mind alucinar a alguiento bring something to mind / call something to mind recordar algo, traer algo a la memoriato change one's mind cambiar de opinión, cambiar de parecerto come to mind ocurrírsele a uno, venir a la menteto cross somebody's mind ocurrírsele a alguien, pasar por la cabeza de alguiento get something/somebody out of one's mind quitarse algo/a alguien de la cabezato give one's mind to something aplicarse en algoto give somebody a piece of one's mind decir cuatro verdades a alguiento go out of one's mind volverse loco,-ato have a mind of one's own saber decidirse por sí mismo,-ato have a good mind to do something estar por hacer algo, estar casi decidido,-a a hacer algoto have half a mind to do something estar por hacer algo, estar casi decidido,-a a hacer algoto have it in mind to do something pensar hacer algoto have somebody/something in mind estar pensando en alguien/algoto have something on one's mind estar preocupado,-a por algoto keep an open mind tener una mente abiertato keep one's mind on something estar atento,-a a algo, prestar atención a algo, concentrarse en algoto lose one's mind perder el juicioto make up one's mind decidirseto put somebody in mind of something recordarle a alguien algoto put something out of one's mind no pensar más en algoto put/set somebody's mind at ease/rest tranquilizar a alguiento put/set/turn one's mind to something proponerse algoto slip somebody's mind olvidársele a unoto somebody's mind en la opinión de alguien■ to my mind en mi opinión, a mi parecerto speak one's mind hablar sin rodeos, decir lo que uno piensato take a load/weight off somebody's mind quitarle a alguien un peso de encimato take somebody's mind off something distraer a alguiento turn something over in one's mind darle vueltas a algomind ['maɪnd] vt1) tend: cuidar, atendermind the children: cuida a los niños2) obey: obedecer3) : preocuparse por, sentirse molestado porI don't mind his jokes: sus bromas no me molestan4) : tener cuidado conmind the ladder!: ¡cuidado con la escalera!mind vi1) obey: obedecer2) care: importarle a unoI don't mind: no me importa, me es igualmind n1) memory: memoria f, recuerdo mkeep it in mind: téngalo en cuenta2) : mente fthe mind and the body: la mente y el cuerpo3) intention: intención f, propósito mto have a mind to do something: tener intención de hacer algo4) : razón fhe's out of his mind: está loco5) opinion: opinión fto change one's mind: cambiar de opinión6) intellect: capacidad f intelectualadv.• mente adv.n.• cabeza s.f.• entendimiento s.m.• inteligencia s.f.• juicio s.m.• memoria s.f.• mente s.f.• mientes s.m.pl.• ánimo s.m.v.• acordarse de v.• atender v.• escuchar v.• fijarse en v.• tener en cuenta v.maɪnd
I
1)a) ( Psych) mente fwith an open/a closed mind — sin/con ideas preconcebidas
to keep an open mind on something — mantener* una mentalidad abierta or no cerrarse* frente a algo
I'm convinced in my own mind that... — yo estoy plenamente convencido de que...
to bear o keep something/somebody in mind — tener* algo/a alguien en cuenta, tener* presente algo/a alguien
to bring o call something to mind: this case brings to mind another incident este caso (nos) recuerda otro incidente; to come to mind: nothing in particular comes to mind no se me ocurre nada en particular; to have something/somebody in mind tener* algo/a alguien en mente; with that in mind pensando en eso; to have something on one's mind: what's on your mind? ¿qué es lo que te preocupa?; to prey o weigh on somebody's mind: it's been preying o weighing on my mind me ha estado preocupando; that put my mind at rest con eso me tranquilizé or me quedé tranquilo; put it out of your mind! no pienses más en eso!; I can see her now in my mind's eye es como si la estuviera viendo; you're not ill: it's all in the mind no estás enfermo, es pura sugestión; I can't get him/the thought out of my mind no puedo quitármelo de la cabeza, no hago más que pensar en él/en eso; it never crossed my mind that... ni se me ocurrió pensar que..., nunca me habría imaginado que..., ni se me pasó por la cabeza que...; to take a load o weight off somebody's mind quitarle a alguien un peso de encima; great minds think alike — (hum) los genios pensamos igual
b) ( mentality) mentalidad fc) ( Phil) (no art) espíritu m2) ( attention)to put one's mind to something: he can be quite charming if he puts his mind to it cuando quiere or cuando se lo propone, es un verdadero encanto; you could finish it today if you put your mind to it si te lo propones puedes terminarlo hoy; he needs something to take his mind off it necesita algo que lo distraiga; it slipped my mind — se me olvidó
3)a) ( opinion)to change one's mind — cambiar de opinión or de parecer or de idea
my mind's made up — lo he decidido, estoy decidido
he spoke his mind — dijo lo que pensaba, habló sin tapujos
to my mind — a mi parecer, en mi opinión
to be in o of two minds about something — estar* indeciso respecto a algo
b) (will, intention)he has a mind of his own — ( he is obstinate) es muy empecinado or porfiado or testarudo; ( he knows his own mind) sabe muy bien lo que quiere
to have a mind to + inf: when he has a mind to cuando quiere, cuando se lo propone; I've a good mind to complain to the manager tengo ganas de ir a quejarme al gerente; I've half a mind to tell her myself casi estoy por decírselo or casi se lo diría yo mismo; she certainly knows her own mind — ciertamente sabe lo que quiere
4) ( mental faculties) juicio m, razón fto be of sound mind — (frml) estar* en pleno uso de sus (or mis etc) facultades (mentales) (frml)
to be/go out of one's mind — estar*/volverse* loco
no one in her/his right mind... — nadie en su sano juicio or en sus cabales...
to blow somebody's mind — (colloq) alucinar a alguien (fam)
5) ( person) mente f, cabeza f, cerebro m
II
1.
1) ( look after) \<\<children\>\> cuidar, cuidar de; \<\<seat/place\>\> guardar, cuidar; \<\<shop/office\>\> atender*a) ( be careful about)mind your head! — ojo or cuidado con la cabeza!
mind how you go! — (colloq) cuídate, vete con cuidado
b) ( concern oneself about) preocuparse pordon't mind me — no se preocupen por mí, hagan como si yo no estuviera
c)never mind — ( let alone)
we didn't break even, never mind make a profit — ni siquiera cubrimos los gastos, ni hablar pues de ganancias
3) ( object to) (usu neg or interrog)I don't mind the noise/cold — no me molesta or no me importa el ruido/frío
I don't mind him, but I can't stand her — él no me disgusta, pero a ella no la soporto
I wouldn't mind a drink — (colloq) no me vendría mal un trago
I don't mind what you do — me da igual or me da lo mismo lo que hagas
to mind -ING: would you mind waiting? ¿le importaría esperar?, espere, por favor; if you don't mind me saying so — si me permites
2.
via) ( take care)mind! — ojo!, cuidado!
b) ( concern oneself)never mind — no importa, no te preocupes (or no se preocupen etc)
2) ( object) (usu neg or interrog)I don't mind — me da igual or lo mismo
have another one - I don't mind if I do! — (BrE hum) tómate otro - hombre, no te diría que no; ( expressing indignation)
do you mind if I smoke? - yes, I do mind! — ¿te importa si fumo? - sí que me importa!
do you mind! — ( expressing indignation) hágame el favor!
3) ( take note) (only in imperative)I'm not promising, mind! — mira que no te lo prometo ¿eh?
he's very generous; mind you, he can afford to be! — es muy generoso; pero claro, puede permitírselo
•Phrasal Verbs:- mind out[maɪnd]1. NOUN1) (=brain, head) mente fa logical/creative mind — una mente racional/creativa
•
it's all in the mind — es pura sugestión•
at the back of my mind I had the feeling that... — tenía la remota sensación de que...•
to bring one's mind to bear on sth — concentrarse en algo•
it came to my mind that... — se me ocurrió que...•
I'm not clear in my mind about it — todavía no lo tengo claro or no lo llego a entender•
it crossed my mind (that) — se me ocurrió (que)yes, it had crossed my mind — sí, eso se me había ocurrido
does it ever cross your mind that...? — ¿piensas alguna vez que...?
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it never entered my mind — jamás se me pasó por la cabeza•
to go over sth in one's mind — repasar algo mentalmente•
to have one's mind on sth — estar pensando en algowhat's on your mind? — ¿qué es lo que te preocupa?
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you can put that right out of your mind — conviene no pensar más en eso•
knowing that he had arrived safely set my mind at ease or rest — el saber que había llegado sano y salvo me tranquilizó•
the thought that springs to mind is... — lo que primero se le ocurre a uno es...•
that will take your mind off it — eso te distraerá•
to be uneasy in one's mind — quedarse con dudasblank 1., 2), read 1., 3), presencethat's a load or weight off my mind! — ¡eso me quita un peso de encima!
2) (=memory)•
to bear sth/sb in mind — tener en cuenta algo/a algnwe must bear (it) in mind that... — debemos tener en cuenta que..., tenemos que recordar que...
to keep sth/sb in mind — tener presente or en cuenta algo/a algn
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to pass out of mind — caer en el olvidotime out of mind — tiempo m inmemorial
it went right or clean out of my mind — se me fue por completo de la cabeza
slip 3., 3), stick II, 2., 5)•
to bring or call sth to mind — recordar algo, traer algo a la memoria3) (=intention)•
you can do it if you have a mind to — puedes lograrlo si de verdad estás empeñado en elloI have half a mind to do it — estoy tentado or me dan ganas de hacerlo
•
nothing was further from my mind — nada más lejos de mi intención•
to have sth in mind — tener pensado algowho do you have in mind for the job? — ¿a quién piensas darle el puesto or tienes en mente para el puesto?
4) (=opinion) opinión f, parecer m•
to change one's mind — cambiar de opinión or idea or parecer•
to have a closed mind — tener una mente cerrada•
to know one's own mind — saber lo que uno quiere•
to make up one's mind — decidirsehe has made up his mind to leave home — ha decidido irse de casa, está decidido a irse de casa
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to my mind — a mi juicio•
to be of one mind — estar de acuerdo•
with an open mind — con espíritu abierto or mentalidad abierta•
to have a mind of one's own — [person] (=think for o.s.) pensar por sí mismo; hum [machine etc] tener voluntad propia, hacer lo que quiere•
to be of the same mind — ser de la misma opinión, estar de acuerdoI was of the same mind as my brother — yo estaba de acuerdo con mi hermano, yo era de la misma opinión que mi hermano
- be in or of two mindspiece 1., 1), speak 2., 2)5) (=mental balance) juicio m•
to lose one's mind — perder el juicio•
nobody in his right mind would do it — nadie que esté en su sano juicio lo haría•
of sound mind — en pleno uso de sus facultades mentales•
of unsound mind — mentalmente incapacitado- be out of one's mindyou must be out of your mind! — ¡tú debes estar loco!
to go out of one's mind — perder el juicio, volverse loco
to go out of one's mind with worry/jealousy — volverse loco de preocupación/celos
6) (=person) mente f, cerebro m2. TRANSITIVE VERB1) (=be careful of) tener cuidado conmind you don't fall — ten cuidado, no te vayas a caer
mind you don't get wet! — ten cuidado, no te vayas a mojar
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mind your head! — ¡cuidado con la cabeza!•
mind your language! — ¡qué manera de hablar es esa!•
mind your manners! — ¡qué modales son esos!•
mind the step! — ¡cuidado con el escalón!•
mind what you're doing! — ¡cuidado con lo que haces!•
mind where you're going! — ¡mira por dónde vas!•
mind yourself! — ¡cuidado, no te vayas a hacer daño!2) (=make sure)mind you do it! — ¡hazlo sin falta!, ¡no dejes de hacerlo!
3) (=pay attention to) hacer caso demind what I say! — ¡hazme caso!, ¡escucha lo que te digo!
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mind your own business! — ¡no te metas donde no te llaman!•
don't mind me — por mí no se preocupedon't mind me! — iro ¡y a mí que me parta un rayo! *
•
never mind that now — olvídate de eso ahora•
mind you, it was raining at the time — claro que or te advierto que en ese momento llovíait was a big one, mind you — era grande, eso sí
4) (=look after) cuidarcould you mind the baby this afternoon? — ¿podrías cuidar al niño esta tarde?
could you mind my bags for a few minutes? — ¿me cuidas or guardas las bolsas un momento?
5) (=dislike, object to)•
I don't mind the cold — a mí no me molesta el fríoI don't mind four, but six is too many — cuatro no me importa, pero seis son muchos
if you don't mind my or me saying so, I think you're wrong — perdona que te diga pero estás equivocado, permíteme que te diga que te equivocas
I don't mind telling you, I was shocked — estaba horrorizado, lo confieso
•
I wouldn't mind a cup of tea — no me vendría mal un té•
do you mind telling me where you've been? — ¿te importa decirme dónde has estado?•
would you mind opening the door? — ¿me hace el favor de abrir la puerta?, ¿le importa(ría) abrir la puerta?7) dialect (=remember) acordarse de, recordarI mind the time when... — me acuerdo de cuando...
3. INTRANSITIVE VERB1) (=be careful) tener cuidadomind! — ¡cuidado!, ¡ojo!, ¡abusado! (Mex)
2) (=object)do you mind? — ¿te importa?
do you mind! — iro ¡por favor!
do you mind if I open the window? — ¿te molesta que abra or si abro la ventana?
do you mind if I come? — ¿te importa que yo venga?
"do you mind if I take this book?" - "I don't mind at all" — -¿te importa si me llevo or que me lleve este libro? -en absoluto
if you don't mind, I won't come — si no te importa, yo no iré
please, if you don't mind — si no le importa, si es tan amable
close the door, if you don't mind — hazme el favor de cerrar la puerta
"cigarette?" - "I don't mind if I do" — -¿un cigarrillo? -pues muchas gracias or bueno or no digo que no
•
never mind — (=don't worry) no te preocupes; (=it makes no odds) es igual, da lo mismo; (=it's not important) no importaI can't walk, never mind run — no puedo andar, ni mucho menos correr
he didn't do it, mind — pero en realidad no lo hizo, la verdad es que no lo hizo
4.COMPOUNDS- mind out* * *[maɪnd]
I
1)a) ( Psych) mente fwith an open/a closed mind — sin/con ideas preconcebidas
to keep an open mind on something — mantener* una mentalidad abierta or no cerrarse* frente a algo
I'm convinced in my own mind that... — yo estoy plenamente convencido de que...
to bear o keep something/somebody in mind — tener* algo/a alguien en cuenta, tener* presente algo/a alguien
to bring o call something to mind: this case brings to mind another incident este caso (nos) recuerda otro incidente; to come to mind: nothing in particular comes to mind no se me ocurre nada en particular; to have something/somebody in mind tener* algo/a alguien en mente; with that in mind pensando en eso; to have something on one's mind: what's on your mind? ¿qué es lo que te preocupa?; to prey o weigh on somebody's mind: it's been preying o weighing on my mind me ha estado preocupando; that put my mind at rest con eso me tranquilizé or me quedé tranquilo; put it out of your mind! no pienses más en eso!; I can see her now in my mind's eye es como si la estuviera viendo; you're not ill: it's all in the mind no estás enfermo, es pura sugestión; I can't get him/the thought out of my mind no puedo quitármelo de la cabeza, no hago más que pensar en él/en eso; it never crossed my mind that... ni se me ocurrió pensar que..., nunca me habría imaginado que..., ni se me pasó por la cabeza que...; to take a load o weight off somebody's mind quitarle a alguien un peso de encima; great minds think alike — (hum) los genios pensamos igual
b) ( mentality) mentalidad fc) ( Phil) (no art) espíritu m2) ( attention)to put one's mind to something: he can be quite charming if he puts his mind to it cuando quiere or cuando se lo propone, es un verdadero encanto; you could finish it today if you put your mind to it si te lo propones puedes terminarlo hoy; he needs something to take his mind off it necesita algo que lo distraiga; it slipped my mind — se me olvidó
3)a) ( opinion)to change one's mind — cambiar de opinión or de parecer or de idea
my mind's made up — lo he decidido, estoy decidido
he spoke his mind — dijo lo que pensaba, habló sin tapujos
to my mind — a mi parecer, en mi opinión
to be in o of two minds about something — estar* indeciso respecto a algo
b) (will, intention)he has a mind of his own — ( he is obstinate) es muy empecinado or porfiado or testarudo; ( he knows his own mind) sabe muy bien lo que quiere
to have a mind to + inf: when he has a mind to cuando quiere, cuando se lo propone; I've a good mind to complain to the manager tengo ganas de ir a quejarme al gerente; I've half a mind to tell her myself casi estoy por decírselo or casi se lo diría yo mismo; she certainly knows her own mind — ciertamente sabe lo que quiere
4) ( mental faculties) juicio m, razón fto be of sound mind — (frml) estar* en pleno uso de sus (or mis etc) facultades (mentales) (frml)
to be/go out of one's mind — estar*/volverse* loco
no one in her/his right mind... — nadie en su sano juicio or en sus cabales...
to blow somebody's mind — (colloq) alucinar a alguien (fam)
5) ( person) mente f, cabeza f, cerebro m
II
1.
1) ( look after) \<\<children\>\> cuidar, cuidar de; \<\<seat/place\>\> guardar, cuidar; \<\<shop/office\>\> atender*a) ( be careful about)mind your head! — ojo or cuidado con la cabeza!
mind how you go! — (colloq) cuídate, vete con cuidado
b) ( concern oneself about) preocuparse pordon't mind me — no se preocupen por mí, hagan como si yo no estuviera
c)never mind — ( let alone)
we didn't break even, never mind make a profit — ni siquiera cubrimos los gastos, ni hablar pues de ganancias
3) ( object to) (usu neg or interrog)I don't mind the noise/cold — no me molesta or no me importa el ruido/frío
I don't mind him, but I can't stand her — él no me disgusta, pero a ella no la soporto
I wouldn't mind a drink — (colloq) no me vendría mal un trago
I don't mind what you do — me da igual or me da lo mismo lo que hagas
to mind -ING: would you mind waiting? ¿le importaría esperar?, espere, por favor; if you don't mind me saying so — si me permites
2.
via) ( take care)mind! — ojo!, cuidado!
b) ( concern oneself)never mind — no importa, no te preocupes (or no se preocupen etc)
2) ( object) (usu neg or interrog)I don't mind — me da igual or lo mismo
have another one - I don't mind if I do! — (BrE hum) tómate otro - hombre, no te diría que no; ( expressing indignation)
do you mind if I smoke? - yes, I do mind! — ¿te importa si fumo? - sí que me importa!
do you mind! — ( expressing indignation) hágame el favor!
3) ( take note) (only in imperative)I'm not promising, mind! — mira que no te lo prometo ¿eh?
he's very generous; mind you, he can afford to be! — es muy generoso; pero claro, puede permitírselo
•Phrasal Verbs:- mind out -
4 Mind Map™
Gen Mgta graphic tool that can be used to visualize and clarify thoughts or ideas. In a Mind Map, the central image or idea is drawn in the middle of a piece of paper with major branches radiating from it to denote related themes. Second and third levels of thought are connected by thinner branches. Mind Maps can include the use of color or pictures. Developed by Tony Buzan, the Mind Mapping technique can be used to introduce order and rationality to thought processes, and develop the creative, artistic, logical, and mathematical elements of the brain. -
5 Bibliography
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6 Creativity
Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with DisorderEven to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)[P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
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7 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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8 imagination
1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) fantasi2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) fantasi; forestillingsevne3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) fantasi* * *1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) fantasi2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) fantasi; forestillingsevne3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) fantasi -
9 imagination
nounit's just your imagination — das bildest du dir nur ein
* * *1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) die Vorstellung2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) die Phantasie3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) die Einbildung* * *im·agi·na·tion[ɪˌmæʤɪˈneɪʃən]n Fantasie f, Vorstellungskraft fthis is all [in] your \imagination! das bildest du dir alles nur ein!use your \imagination! lassen Sie doch mal Ihre Fantasie spielen!lack of \imagination Fantasielosigkeit fnot by any stretch of the \imagination beim besten Willen [o bei aller Liebe] nichtto catch sb's \imagination jdn fesseln [o in seinen Bann ziehen]to leave nothing to the \imagination für die Fantasie keinen Platz [mehr] lassen* * *[I"mdZI'neISən]n(creative) Fantasie f, Phantasie f, Vorstellungskraft f, Einbildungskraft f; (self-deceptive) Einbildung fto have (a lively or vivid) imagination — (eine lebhafte or rege) Fantasie haben
he has little imagination — er hat wenig Fantasie
in order to encourage children to use their imagination(s) — um die Fantasie von Kindern anzuregen
to lack imagination — fantasielos or einfallslos sein
it's just your imagination! — das bilden Sie sich (dat) nur ein!
to capture or catch sb's imagination — jdn in seinen Bann ziehen
it captures the imagination — es ist faszinierend
* * *imagination [ıˌmædʒıˈneıʃn] s1. (schöpferische) Fantasie, Vorstellungs-, Einbildungskraft f, Fantasie-, Einfalls-, Ideenreichtum m:this is beyond my imagination das übersteigt meine Fantasie;he has no imagination er hat keine Fantasie, er ist fantasielos;she doesn’t leave anything to imagination sie überlässt nichts der Fantasie;use your imagination lass dir etwas einfallen!, lass deine Fantasie spielen; → academic.ru/10763/capture">capture A 5 c, stretch A 112. Vorstellen n, Vorstellung f:in imagination in der Vorstellung, im Geiste3. Vorstellung f:a) Einbildung f:pure imagination reine Einbildung;maybe it was just my imagination vielleicht habe ich mir das alles auch nur eingebildetb) Idee f, Gedanke m, Einfall m4. koll Einfälle pl, Ideen(reichtum) pl(m)* * *noun1) no pl., no art. Fantasie, die* * *n.Einbildung f.Phantasie -n f.Vorstellung f. -
10 imagination
[ɪmædʒɪ'neɪʃən]n(inventiveness, part of mind) wyobraźnia f; ( illusion) urojenie nt* * *1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) wyobraźnia2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) fantazja3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) wyobraźnia -
11 Music
The serious composer who thinks about his art will sooner or later have occasion to ask himself: why is it so important to my own psyche that I compose music? What makes it seem so absolutely necessary, so that every other daily activity, by comparison, is of lesser significance? And why is the creative impulse never satisfied; why must one always begin anew? To the first question-the need to create-the answer is always the same-self-expression; the basic need to make evident one's deepest feelings about life. But why is the job never done? Why must one always begin again? The reason for the compulsion to renewed creativity, it seems to me, is that each added work brings with it an element of selfdiscovery. I must create in order to know myself, and since selfknowledge is a never-ending search, each new work is only a part-answer to the question "Who am I?" and brings with it the need to go on to other and different part-answers. (Copland, 1952, pp. 40-41)When collaboration occurs, when, for a while, the lines of conscious and unconscious thought run along the same track, we achieve the feeling of wholeness and satisfaction which is characteristic of our response to great art and other transcendent states of mind. The patterns of music, translated, analyzed, shorn of detail, are able to stimulate the patterns of emotions on many levels simultaneously, thus bringing various hierarchical states of consciousness and unconsciousness into harmony with one another during the existence of the music for us, whether this is in a performance or purely in the memory. As this happens we experience the sense of unity which arises from the cessation of conflict between conscious and unconscious. (McLaughlin, 1970, pp. 104-105)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Music
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12 imagination
1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) imaginación2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) imaginación3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) imaginaciónimagination n imaginacióntr[ɪmæʤɪ'neɪʃən]\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLto let one's imagination run away with one dejarse llevar por la imaginaciónimagination [ɪ.mæʤə'neɪʃən] n: imaginación fn.• imaginación s.f.• imaginativo s.m.• magín s.m.ɪ'mædʒə'neɪʃən, ɪˌmædʒɪ'neɪʃəna) u c ( faculty) imaginación fit's only your imagination — son imaginaciones or figuraciones tuyas
to capture the public imagination — despertar* or atraer* el interés del público
what were they doing? - use your imagination! — ¿qué estaban haciendo? - pues, imagínatelo
b) u ( inventiveness) inventiva f, imaginación f, idea f[ɪˌmædʒɪ'neɪʃǝn]N (=mental ability) imaginación f ; (=inventiveness) imaginación f, inventiva fit's all in your imagination — te lo estás imaginando, son imaginaciones tuyas
was it my imagination or did I see you there? — ¿me lo he imaginado o te vi allí de verdad?
to have a vivid imagination — tener una imaginación muy viva or despierta
it doesn't take much imagination to realize what happened — no hace falta tener mucha imaginación para darse cuenta de lo que ocurrió
* * *[ɪ'mædʒə'neɪʃən, ɪˌmædʒɪ'neɪʃən]a) u c ( faculty) imaginación fit's only your imagination — son imaginaciones or figuraciones tuyas
to capture the public imagination — despertar* or atraer* el interés del público
what were they doing? - use your imagination! — ¿qué estaban haciendo? - pues, imagínatelo
b) u ( inventiveness) inventiva f, imaginación f, idea f -
13 imagination
[ɪˌmædʒɪ'neɪʃn]nome immaginazione f.to see sth. in one's imagination — immaginarsi qcs.
is it my imagination, or...? — sogno, o...?
not by any stretch of the imagination could you say... — neanche con un grande sforzo di immaginazione potresti dire
* * *1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) immaginazione2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) immaginazione3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) immaginazione* * *[ɪˌmædʒɪ'neɪʃn]nome immaginazione f.to see sth. in one's imagination — immaginarsi qcs.
is it my imagination, or...? — sogno, o...?
not by any stretch of the imagination could you say... — neanche con un grande sforzo di immaginazione potresti dire
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14 imagination
1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) fantasi2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) fantasi, innlevelse3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) innbilningfantasisubst. \/ɪˌmædʒɪˈneɪʃ(ə)n\/1) fantasi, forestillingsevne, innbilningskraft2) innbilningdraw on one's imagination ta fantasien til hjelpin imagination i fantasienlet one's imagination run riot\/wild la fantasien få fritt spillerom, la fantasien løpe løpsk -
15 imagination
1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) ímyndun2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) ímyndunarafl3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) ímyndun -
16 imagination
fantázia, képzelet* * *1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) képzelet2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) képzelőtehetség3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) képzelődés -
17 imagination
1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) imaginação2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) imaginação3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) imaginação* * *im.ag.i.na.tion[imædʒin'eiʃən] n 1 imaginação, idéia. 2 conceito. -
18 imagination
n. hayal gücü, imgelem, hayal, hayal etme, kuruntu, tasavvur* * *1. hayal 2. hayal gücü 3. imgelem* * *1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) zihin, akıl, hayal2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) yaratıcılık, hayal etme gücü3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) kuruntu, vehim -
19 imagination
1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) domišljija2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) domišljija3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) domišljija* * *[imædžinéišən]noundomišljija, fantazija; predstava; ustvarjalni duhstretch of the imagination — iznajdljivost, domiselnostuse your imagination! — domisli se česa -
20 imagination
• fantasia• haave• mielikuvitus• kuvitelma• kuvittelukyky• kuvittelu• kuvaus• luovuus• luulottelu* * *1) ((the part of the mind which has) the ability to form mental pictures: I can see it all in my imagination.) mielikuvitus2) (the creative ability of a writer etc: This book shows a lot of imagination.) mielikuvitus3) (the seeing etc of things which do not exist: There was no-one there - it was just your imagination.) kuvittelu
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